Accepted, "The Problem of Public Shaming" The Journal of Political Philosophy
I argue that public shaming on the internet raises various problems of scale. The idea is that public shaming on a scale as massive as the internet is bound to run into various pathologies. Ultimately, I argue this implies we would be better off without engaging in mass-scale public shaming.
Accepted, "The Technology of Public Shaming," Social Philosophy and Policy
I suggest public shaming on the internet is fruitfully seen as a problem of technology. Specifically, there is a mismatch between two senses of the technology of public shaming. On the one hand, there is the artifacts of shaming: the use of social media to shame people. On the other hand, there is the fact that public shaming is itself a social technology to promote cooperation. I argue that there is a tension between these public shaming as a social technology and using the internet for public shaming.
Forthcoming, "What Could Justify Occupational Licensing Requirements?" Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy
I consider a wide range of justifications for occupational licensing requirements, finding most lacking. The only justification I find slightly compelling is that occupational licensing requirements may be necessary to avoid disastrous negative externalities to poor service.
Forthcoming, "Incentives, Inequality, and Community Revisited" Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 8
A sequel to my 2017 Economics and Philosophy paper. I argue that inequality-creating incentives are compatible with community to the extent that such incentives act as a solution to the problem of free-riding. Of interest is a brief discussion of actual communes like the kibbutz.
Forthcoming, "The Social Bases of Freedom," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
In this paper, I argue that perhaps republican theorists of freedom ought to consider freedom as not a negative property like non-domination, but a positive property in the form of a status. Once we see freedom as a status, I suggest this leads us to the idea that freedom has social bases: What makes us free are various features of social life that give us good reasons to see ourselves as free.
2020, "Domination and Efficiency in the Socialist Republic: A Reply to O'Shea," Political Theory 48(5): 573-580
A brief reply where I raise questions for those who would marry the cause of non-domination to public ownership of the means of production. The general lesson: Caring about non-domination implies caring about efficiency.
2020. "The Ethics of Noncompete Clauses." Business Ethics Quarterly 30(2): 229-249
Recently, noncompete clauses, or clauses in contracts that limit an employee's ability to work after leaving a company, have come under critical scrutiny in both the public discourse and philosophical literature (most notably by Elizabeth Anderson). This paper asks if anything can be said in favor of noncompete clauses that takes seriously employee interests. I argue yes - noncompete clauses can act as a commitment device under the right circumstances.
2018. "Freedom without Law." Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17(3): 298-316
This paper considers the claim that there is no freedom without law. I suggest that the most plausible arguments in favor of the no freedom without law thesis also apply to another social form - social norms. Appreciating this shows how even the strongest defenders of the no freedom without law thesis have reason to be wary of the state in securing our freedom.
2017. "Incentives, Offers, and Community." Economics and Philosophy 33(3): 367-390
A common justification offered for unequal pay is that it encourages socially beneficial productivity. I defend the incentives argument against a famous criticism by G. A. Cohen by turning his (in)famous camping trip example against him.
2017. "Democratic Authority and Respect for Law" with George Klosko. Law and Philosophy 36(1): 1-23
This paper (co-authored with George Klosko) argues that recent attempts to ground authority in democracy fail. At best, we argue, democracy gives us reasons to respect the law, but not reasons to obey the law.
2016. "The Relation of Envy to Distributive Justice." Social Theory and Practice 42(3): 501-524
I advance two related claims in this paper. The first claim is that envy is a vice that has no place in the construction of ideals of justice. The second claim is that, although vices play no role in constructing justice, vices, such as envy, perhaps have a motivational role to play in facing injustice.
2015. "Putting Incentives in Context: A Reply to Penny." Res Publica 21(1): 93-98
A short response paper arguing against the claim the inequality-creating incentives endanger the self-respect of the least advantaged. I argue that what matters for self-respect is not what others have, but that we have enough.
I argue that public shaming on the internet raises various problems of scale. The idea is that public shaming on a scale as massive as the internet is bound to run into various pathologies. Ultimately, I argue this implies we would be better off without engaging in mass-scale public shaming.
Accepted, "The Technology of Public Shaming," Social Philosophy and Policy
I suggest public shaming on the internet is fruitfully seen as a problem of technology. Specifically, there is a mismatch between two senses of the technology of public shaming. On the one hand, there is the artifacts of shaming: the use of social media to shame people. On the other hand, there is the fact that public shaming is itself a social technology to promote cooperation. I argue that there is a tension between these public shaming as a social technology and using the internet for public shaming.
Forthcoming, "What Could Justify Occupational Licensing Requirements?" Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy
I consider a wide range of justifications for occupational licensing requirements, finding most lacking. The only justification I find slightly compelling is that occupational licensing requirements may be necessary to avoid disastrous negative externalities to poor service.
Forthcoming, "Incentives, Inequality, and Community Revisited" Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 8
A sequel to my 2017 Economics and Philosophy paper. I argue that inequality-creating incentives are compatible with community to the extent that such incentives act as a solution to the problem of free-riding. Of interest is a brief discussion of actual communes like the kibbutz.
Forthcoming, "The Social Bases of Freedom," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
In this paper, I argue that perhaps republican theorists of freedom ought to consider freedom as not a negative property like non-domination, but a positive property in the form of a status. Once we see freedom as a status, I suggest this leads us to the idea that freedom has social bases: What makes us free are various features of social life that give us good reasons to see ourselves as free.
2020, "Domination and Efficiency in the Socialist Republic: A Reply to O'Shea," Political Theory 48(5): 573-580
A brief reply where I raise questions for those who would marry the cause of non-domination to public ownership of the means of production. The general lesson: Caring about non-domination implies caring about efficiency.
2020. "The Ethics of Noncompete Clauses." Business Ethics Quarterly 30(2): 229-249
Recently, noncompete clauses, or clauses in contracts that limit an employee's ability to work after leaving a company, have come under critical scrutiny in both the public discourse and philosophical literature (most notably by Elizabeth Anderson). This paper asks if anything can be said in favor of noncompete clauses that takes seriously employee interests. I argue yes - noncompete clauses can act as a commitment device under the right circumstances.
2018. "Freedom without Law." Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17(3): 298-316
This paper considers the claim that there is no freedom without law. I suggest that the most plausible arguments in favor of the no freedom without law thesis also apply to another social form - social norms. Appreciating this shows how even the strongest defenders of the no freedom without law thesis have reason to be wary of the state in securing our freedom.
2017. "Incentives, Offers, and Community." Economics and Philosophy 33(3): 367-390
A common justification offered for unequal pay is that it encourages socially beneficial productivity. I defend the incentives argument against a famous criticism by G. A. Cohen by turning his (in)famous camping trip example against him.
2017. "Democratic Authority and Respect for Law" with George Klosko. Law and Philosophy 36(1): 1-23
This paper (co-authored with George Klosko) argues that recent attempts to ground authority in democracy fail. At best, we argue, democracy gives us reasons to respect the law, but not reasons to obey the law.
2016. "The Relation of Envy to Distributive Justice." Social Theory and Practice 42(3): 501-524
I advance two related claims in this paper. The first claim is that envy is a vice that has no place in the construction of ideals of justice. The second claim is that, although vices play no role in constructing justice, vices, such as envy, perhaps have a motivational role to play in facing injustice.
2015. "Putting Incentives in Context: A Reply to Penny." Res Publica 21(1): 93-98
A short response paper arguing against the claim the inequality-creating incentives endanger the self-respect of the least advantaged. I argue that what matters for self-respect is not what others have, but that we have enough.