2018. "Freedom without Law," Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17(3): 298-316
This paper considers the claim that there is no freedom without law. I suggest that the most plausible arguments in favor of the no freedom without law thesis also apply to another social form - social norms. Appreciating this shows how even the strongest defenders of the no freedom without law thesis have reason to be wary of the state in securing our freedom.
2017. "Incentives, Offers, and Community." Economics and Philosophy 33(3): 367-390
A common justification offered for unequal pay is that it encourages socially beneficial productivity. I defend the incentives argument against a famous criticism by G. A. Cohen by turning his (in)famous camping trip example against him.
2017. "Democratic Authority and Respect for Law" with George Klosko. Law and Philosophy 36(1): 1-23
This paper (co-authored with George Klosko) argues that recent attempts to ground authority in democracy fail. At best, we argue, democracy gives us reasons to respect the law, but not reasons to obey the law.
2016. "The Relation of Envy to Distributive Justice." Social Theory and Practice 42(3): 501-524
I advance two related claims in this paper. The first claim is that envy is a vice that has no place in the construction of ideals of justice. The second claim is that, although vices play no role in constructing justice, vices, such as envy, perhaps have a motivational role to play in facing injustice.
2015. "Putting Incentives in Context: A Reply to Penny." Res Publica 21(1): 93-98
A short response paper arguing against the claim the inequality-creating incentives endanger the self-respect of the least advantaged. I argue that what matters for self-respect is not what others have, but that we have enough.
This paper considers the claim that there is no freedom without law. I suggest that the most plausible arguments in favor of the no freedom without law thesis also apply to another social form - social norms. Appreciating this shows how even the strongest defenders of the no freedom without law thesis have reason to be wary of the state in securing our freedom.
2017. "Incentives, Offers, and Community." Economics and Philosophy 33(3): 367-390
A common justification offered for unequal pay is that it encourages socially beneficial productivity. I defend the incentives argument against a famous criticism by G. A. Cohen by turning his (in)famous camping trip example against him.
2017. "Democratic Authority and Respect for Law" with George Klosko. Law and Philosophy 36(1): 1-23
This paper (co-authored with George Klosko) argues that recent attempts to ground authority in democracy fail. At best, we argue, democracy gives us reasons to respect the law, but not reasons to obey the law.
2016. "The Relation of Envy to Distributive Justice." Social Theory and Practice 42(3): 501-524
I advance two related claims in this paper. The first claim is that envy is a vice that has no place in the construction of ideals of justice. The second claim is that, although vices play no role in constructing justice, vices, such as envy, perhaps have a motivational role to play in facing injustice.
2015. "Putting Incentives in Context: A Reply to Penny." Res Publica 21(1): 93-98
A short response paper arguing against the claim the inequality-creating incentives endanger the self-respect of the least advantaged. I argue that what matters for self-respect is not what others have, but that we have enough.